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ECLECTIC APPROACH TO THE CATEGORICAL 




This work specifically looks at the concept of the categorical 
imperative as a pivotal principle in Kant’s deontology and Mill’s 
conception of pleasure. The focus is to examine potential opening for 
harmonisation. Thus we establish here, that the basic drivers for these 
principles are the same. This creates an opening for eclecticism even 
though the two conceptions are embedded in two theories that lie at 
the extreme opposites of the moral continuum. The motivation is that 
contemporary complex moral decision-making elicits an eclectic 
approach in normative assessment of theories to respond to 
praxeology in deciding on an action that has a moral content. 
Introduction 
The moral law, in Kant’s thought is a kind of command that 
demands obedience. This is different from the normal commands we 
encounter in our daily lives, which are normally issued by a supreme 
being or other authorities. The moral law that Kant alludes to is 
promulgated by reason. This is not like any other imperative of 
which one has ever heard of, because it is not a means to the 
achievement of anything and it also has no relation to whatever 
anyone wants. It, thus, becomes a command which is absolute and 
as such has to be obeyed without any exception. Before proceeding 
with an in-depth explanation of the categorical imperative, we need 
to explain what Kant means by imperative and who qualifies to be a 
rational agent. A rational agent as explained by Paton (1964) is one 
who has the power to act in accordance with one’s idea of laws or 
principles. This is what we mean when we say of a rational agent 
that he has a will. The actions of a rational agent have a subjective 
principle or maxim and objective principle. This objective principle 
is one on which a rational agent would necessarily act if his passion 
is controlled by reason. Actions based on these principles may be 
described as in some sense ‘good’. We must, however, note Kant’s 
observation that humans do not always act on objective principles, 
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the reason being that we are imperfect rational beings. For rational 
beings that are imperfect like humans, objective principles always 
necessitate the will. In cases when objective principles seem to 
necessitate the will, the principle may be described as a command, 
or an imperative. Kant (1959)in distinguishing between different 
kinds of imperatives observes that some imperatives are conditioned 
by a will for some particular ends. In this case, such an imperative 
would necessarily give rise to hypothetical imperatives. They bid us 
to do actions which are good as a means to an end that we might 
will. 
However, some imperatives or objective principles are 
unconditional. Such principles would necessarily be followed by a 
rational agent without any desire for the attainment of some ulterior 
end. They may also be called ‘apodeictic’, that is, it is necessary in 
the sense of it being unconditioned and absolute (Kant, 1959). 
Hypothetical imperative is a conditional imperative which 
commands a person to do something as a means to an end (Kant, 
1959). Thus, it is a command of reason that applies only if we desire 
the goal.  For instance, statements like, “be honest, so that people 
will think well of you”, “if you want to pass the course you ought to 
complete the assignment” are all examples of hypothetical 
imperatives. He further distinguishes between problematic 
hypothetical imperative and assertoric hypothetical 
imperatives(Kant, 1959). Example of problematic hypothetical 
imperatives is;“If you want to be a good philosopher you must study 
ethics”. Assertoric hypothetical imperative, however, commands 
one to believe in certain ways in order to be happy (Omoregbe, 
2004).  Directly opposite the deontological views shared by Kant 
are consequentialist positions. Central to this perspective is the 
allusions made by pleasure theories among some of which are 
hedonism and utilitarianism which can be referred to as modern 
hedonism. The primacy of pleasure in human action was central in 
Cyrenaic hedonism founded by aristippus of cyrene. The dominant 
thought which they proclaimed was the socratic belief that virtue is 
a sine qua non of happiness. Here, they equated pleasure with 
happiness and concluded that pleasure is man’s highest attainable 
good (Sahakian..).it is important to note that cyrenaics held a 
quantitative view of hedonism. This means that they conceived of 
pleasure as being of a single kind; physical satisfaction and as a 
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result it could not be designated as either inferior or superior sice 
they only differ in intensity or duration. The corollary analysis is 
that pleasure is not intrinsically evil, however, the laws and customs 
of a society designates it as being good or evil. Further, they 
conceived of two kinds of emotion; emotion of pleasure which 
consisted of the sensation of gentle motion and the emotion of pain 
which is a violent motion. Pleasure here could be equated to the 
pleasant feeling of a hungry person who has immediately satisfied 
his appetite. 
Utilitarianism in British philosophy can be traced as far 
back as William Paley (1743-1805). Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) 
is, however, considered the father of modern Utilitarianism in the 
proper sense. He is considered as such because he was responsible 
for making the utilitarian principle serve as the basis for a unified 
and comprehensive ethical system that applies, at least in theory, to 
every area of human life. Bentham (1789) begins the ethical part of 
his work,The Principles of Morals and Legislation(1789)with a 
straight forward statement that, “Nature has placed mankind under 
the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure” 
(Bentham, 1789). By this anything that seems good must either be 
pleasurable or thought to be a means to pleasure or to the avoidance 
of pain. Conversely, anything that seems bad must either be directly 
painful or thought to be a means to pain or to the deprivation of 
pleasure. From this proposition, Bentham further argues that the 
words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ can only be meaningful if they are used in 
accordance with the utilitarian principle, so that whatever increases 
the net surplus of pleasure over pain is right and whatever decreases 
it is wrong (Bentham, 1789). To him we must calculate the amount 
of pleasure to be derived from an action before we act. In this way, 
we use the hedonistic calculus to consider the nature of certain 
pleasures and pains by looking at their intensity, how long they last 
or their duration, purity, propinquity, fecundity and whether they 
tend to give rise to further feelings of the same kind.  
It is possible to think that Bentham did not really aim at 
propounding a theory that was to explain or justify ordinary moral 
view but rather, develop a system that was to reform ordinary moral 
behaviour. The striking fact about Bentham’s theory is that, instead 
of deriving the concept of human nature from the ultimate end of 
human activity, he draws the ideas of human ends from the real 
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nature of man.For Bentham, utility is the normative link between 
our conception of humans and the desired end of human actions 
directed towards the happiness of all those directly or indirectly 
affected by the action. Thus, the principle of utility demands that an 
action is right or wrong according to the tendency of the action to 
advance or thwart the production of the happiness of the party 
whose interest is in question, be it individual or collective. 
Bentham’s position was criticised for being fit for the pigs, 
especially, when he reaffirmed that all pleasures are equal but only 
differ in quantity. In other words, a child’s play is equal to reading 
poetry. Mill (1863), the leading proponent of the utilitarian theory 
after Bentham, in his work, Utilitarianism made several 
modifications to the theory, all aimed at establishing a broader view 
of what utilitarianism really stood for and also to make the theory 
less vulnerable to criticisms. We, however, note that Mill reaffirmed 
the basic tenet of utilitarianism as Bentham (1789) had outlined. He 
thus conceived that the creed which accepts as the foundation of 
morals,  utility or the greatest happiness principle holds that actions 
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as 
tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the 
privation of pleasure (Mill, 1863). 
Although his position is also based on the minimisation of 
happiness, which consists of pleasure and the absence of pain, he 
distinguishes between pleasures that are higher and/or lower in 
quality. Thus, he said that it is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied” (Mill, 1863). More so, Mill (1871) also sought 
to show that Utilitarianism is compatible with moral rules and 
principle relating to justice, honesty and truthfulness. This he did 
with the argument that moral agents should not attempt to calculate 
the pleasure to be derived before an action is taken. Instead, they 
should be guided by the fact that an action falls under a general 
principle, such as the principle tends to increase happiness (Mill, 
1863). However, we may consider whether exceptions can be made 
but it might seem possible under very necessary and specific 
circumstances. 
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The Categorical Imperative  
The categorical imperative on a critical assessment is a command 
that addresses, controls and constrains our will. Here there are no 
‘ifs’, one ought to do it, period (Omoregbe, 2004). This, according 
to Kant, is so because morality concerns how we ought to live and 
act.  Thus to Kant; 
…there is one imperative which directly commands 
a certain conduct without making its condition 
some purpose to be reached by it.This imperative is 
categorical. It concerns not the material of the 
action and its intended result but the form and the 
principle from which it results. What is essentially 
good in it consists in the intention, the result being 
what it may. This imperative may be called the 
imperative of morality. (Kant, 1959:    ) 
By this, a categorical imperative is unconditional and 
independent of anything, circumstances, goals or desires.  It is for 
this reason that only a categorical imperative can be a universal and 
binding law; that is, a moral law valid for all rational beings at all 
times. Kant explains the categorical imperative with an assumption 
that a principle upon which a perfectly rational agent would act is 
also that upon which an imperfectly rational agent ought to act if he 
is tempted to do otherwise. It must be noted, here, that Kant’s 
deontology is guided by a fundamental belief that everything in 
nature works according to rules and morally it is only rational 
beings that have the power to act in accordance with these principles 
or rules (Ozumba, 2002).  As a result, the categorical imperative is 
one of such principles by which rational agents act. The categorical 
imperative is, therefore, an imperative of reason itself and is used 
for making other rules Kant calls maxims.  This is similar to the 
Golden Rule which states that “Do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you” (Audi, 1996). The question of the Golden Rule, 
however, is not without problems.  For instance, the rule would not 
be able to answer a question like; “Does everybody want to be done 
unto as you do unto yourself, however good or bad that action might 
be?”  
 The categorical imperative which emanates from the 
concept of duty also implies the absolute application of moral laws.  
Kwo Kwegya: Eclectic Approach to the Categorical ... 
34 
 
By this, a maxim which one wills that it can become a universal law 
does become absolute since that maxim becomes categorical.  Also, 
many maxims which we think might be very beneficial at a certain 
stage in one’s life would become self-defeating. It is obvious that 
telling lies, for instance, is sometimes very beneficial to humanity, 
in spite of its moral connotation. However, in the realm of Kantian 
ethics absolute rules and the strict adherence to duty some of these 
maxims would become unhelpful and morally empty. The maxim 
that “it is permissible to lie” when fully analyzed in Kantian ethics 
would be self-defeating since it is generally accepted that lying is 
wrong. More so, if this maxim was to become absolute, the idea of 
truthfulness will lose its value and people will lie to achieve 
whatever ends they want to. 
This view of absolutely endorsing the wrongness of lies is 
not devoid of problems.  A reflection on this question brings many 
examples to mind.  A typical example is the case of the inquiring 
murderer who enters a house looking for a young lady running away 
from him. At this stage eye witnesses are left abase whether to tell 
the truth or lie about the whereabouts of the lady. Such an example 
indeed shows the difficulty in the universalisability and even 
possible non-universalisability of certain maxims.  This is because 
the duty not to lie seriously comes into conflict with the duty to save 
(an innocent) life. On the basis of this example, we are left biting 
our nails since we do not know whether a different maxim might 
better be universalisable.   
We, so far, realize that being a moral agent, then, means 
guiding one’s conduct by “universal laws”, that is, moral rules that 
hold without exception in all circumstances. As such, we should 
only do those actions that conform to rules that we could will to be 
adopted universally.  And so if we lie, we would be following the 
rule that “it is permissible to lie.”  This rule could however not be 
adopted universally because it would be self-defeating since people 
would stop believing one another and then it would do no good to 
lie.  Therefore, we should not lie and the duty not to lie is, in this 
case, absolute, Kant reiterates.  
However, some situations provide an example of when an 
exception is in order.  Kantian thought indicates that we would be 
morally responsible for any bad consequences as a result of our 
lying. Suppose, however, that our telling the truth results in a 
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morally reprehensible outcome?  Here, Kant seems to suggest that 
we would be blameless.  But how convincing is his response?  In 
considering the duty not to lie as an absolute rule or maxim which 
would, of course, admit of no exceptions, we still would have to 
answer a question like, what is the wrongness in lying to save an 
innocent person’s life? 
With reference to the categorical imperative, Kant offers 
three formulations. The first is the Formula of Universal Law. This 
formula holds that, act only on that maxim through which you can at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law(Kant, 
1959).Generally, a categorical imperative simply bids us to act in 
accordance with a universal law. In other words, we are to act on a 
principle which is valid for all rational beings and not merely on that 
which becomes valid when it is a means to a certain end, be it our 
own end or the desired end of others. Another way to understand 
this formula is that, moral imperatives require that the maxims be 
chosen as though they should hold as universal laws of nature 
(Paton, 1964). Thus, one interpretation of the first formulation is 
called the universalisability test which has five steps. 
 The agent finds a maxim.  
 The agent imagines a possible world in which everyone in a 
similar position follows that maxim. 
 The agent decides whether there are contradictions or 
irrationalities as a result of following the maxim.   
 If a contradiction or irrationality arises, acting on that 
maxim is not allowed. 
 If there is no contradiction, then, acting on that maxim is 
permissible (Davidson, 1968) 
 
The second formulation of the CI is the formula of the End-in-Itself. 
The formula holds that, act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end 
(Kant, 1959). Here, the ends being referred to might either be 
subjective or objective ends. The subjective ends might be 
hypothetical imperatives; their adoption is at the individual’s 
discretion. It may also be an objective end, that is, an end which 
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carries an unconditional value and which a rational agent would 
necessarily pursue. The principle here is, act with reference to every 
rational being so that it is an end in itself in your maxim.   
The Formula of the Law of Nature is conceived as the third 
formulation. It states that, act as if the maxim of your action were to 
become through your will a universal law of nature (Kant, 1959). 
Primarily, a law of nature may be conceived as a law of cause and 
effect. However, as Paton (1964) explains, when Kant asks us to 
consider our maxims as if they were laws of nature, he treats these 
laws as teleological. Kant generally holds, according to this formula, 
that one becomes morally good when one acts on an impersonal 
principle valid for oneself and for others and not because one acts 
from passion or self-interest. This, Kant believes, is the essence of 
morality. He, however, thinks that if we wish to test the maxim of a 
proposed action, we must ask whether it would further a systematic 
harmony of purposes in the individual and in the human race, if the 
maxim is universally adopted (Ewing, 1976). So act that your will 
can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through 
its maxim (Kant, 1959), is referred to as the formula of Autonomy. 
The formula carries the import that the categorical imperative does 
not only bid us to merely follow a universal law, but to follow a 
universal law which we ourselves make as rational agents. Kant 
believes that this is the most important formulation of the supreme 
principle of morality since it leads to the idea of freedom. The 
implicit explanation is that human beings are not only bound to obey 
universal laws but that rational agents are the foundation of these 
laws.The last formulation for the CI is the formula of the Kingdom 
of Ends which also states that so act as if you were through your 
maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends (Kant, 1959). 
The formula means that since rational agents are all subject to 
universal laws which they themselves make, they constitute a 
kingdom and so far as these laws bid them to treat each other as 
ends in themselves, the kingdom so constituted is a kingdom of 
ends. The formula is therefore seen to have sprung directly from the 
formula of Autonomy.  
Generally, Kant first introduced the idea that our actions 
possess moral worth when we do our duty for its own sake as 
something accepted by our common moral consciousness and, then, 
tried to show that it is an essential element of any rational morality. 
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One may ask then, does our common moral consciousness really 
insist that there is no moral worth in any action done for any motive 
other than duty?  If so, then we certainly will not praise the young 
man who plunges into the river to rescue a drowning child if we 
learned that he did it because he expected a handsome reward from 
the child’s rich father.  But can we legitimately say it has no moral 
worth because the young man had other intentions?  And would we 
happily advocate that people emulate the gestures of the young 
man?  It would be difficult to know at this point which inclination 
followed the other.  Whether it is the drive to save an innocent 
drowning child or the drive of a reward. 
Kant’s deontological ethics seems to run counter with the 
thoughts of those who see benevolent or sympathetic feelings as 
constituting a moral base. But we think that even a cursory analysis 
would reveal that there is, more often than not, a thin line between 
sympathetic feeling to act and an act of duty.  For instance, how 
would we be able to explain the judgment of a jury who give a 
minimum sentence to a pregnant woman for theft?  One cannot 
argue that they have not performed their duties since their duty was 
to punish thieves, however they could have given a maximum 
sentence to the pregnant woman.One can at this point summarize the 
categorical imperative by saying that it is an imperative because it 
commands the will and it is categorical because it commands us to 
do something unconditionally, which is without regard to 
consequences or personal desires (Birsch, 2002). The justification 
for it is that it is an injunction based upon reason. 
 
Mill’s Qualitative Pleasure 
Having been impressed by Bentham’s utilitarian ideas, Mill (1806-
1873), who was Bentham’s intellectual successor, saw the need to 
clothe utilitarianism with certain idealistic characteristics in order to 
rescue it from its uncouth lapse into a “pig philosophy”.  It must be 
noted that Bentham’s basic premise was that the good was pleasure, 
which was of single quality and calculable in quantitative terms 
(Bentham, 1879). Mill reasoned that, in this case, it would be 
difficult to distinguish between a rational and irrational being since 
Bentham’s claim implies that as long as one is enjoying pleasure it 
does not matter what kind of pleasure it is. Mill, then, introduced the 
concept of qualitative hedonism.  This is the theory that pleasure 
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differs in kind as well as quality (Mill, 1895). That is, there are 
pleasures that are high in quality but low in quantity or less intense. 
Also, there are quantitatively higher pleasures with low quality. In 
his explanation, Sahakian (1974) used this example, that comparing 
a ton of coal to an ounce of diamond; all things being equal, a ton of 
coal is less valuable than a tiny diamond, despite the fact that both 
are composed of carbon atoms.  In showing the need for us to 
consider the quality of pleasure other than the quantity, he said; 
 
The only true or definite rule of conduct or standard 
of morality is the greatest happiness, but there is 
needed first a philosophical estimate of happiness. 
Quality as well as quantity of happiness is to be 
considered; less of a higher kind is preferable to 
more of a lower.  The test of quality is the 
preference given by those who are acquainted with 
both.  Socrates would rather choose to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than to be a pig satisfied. The pig 
probably would not, but then the pig knows only 
one side of the question; Socrates knows both (Mill, 
1895:    ). 
The view that Mill entertains, here, is that when it comes to 
deciding which pleasures are more valuable than the other, it is the 
hedonic expert who is in a best position to do that because he has 
adequate experience with both types of pleasures.  The hedonic 
expert is someone who has attained the rational and experiential 
capacity of both qualitative and quantitative pleasures and is aware 
of the long and short-term effects of both. Such a person, according 
to Mill, knows that it is preferable to be a human being than to be an 
animal because, he knows there is an important qualitative pleasure 
in merely being a man which vastly outweighs all the physical 
pleasures afforded to animals.  Thus, for Mill, a being of higher 
faculties requires more to make him happy, capable probably of 
more acute suffering and is certainly accessible to it at more points 
than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities he can 
never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of 
existence (Mill, 1895). 
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With this further explanation, Mill sought to strengthen the 
potency of utilitarianism as a viable and respectable moral theory.  It 
must be noted that Mill’s claim seems to be comparable to that of 
Bentham, who argues that when a person is experiencing pleasure, it 
is difficult, if not impossible for him to deny that he, indeed, likes it 
(Bentham, 1879).  In other words, while pleasure is being 
experienced, an individual must admit that he is in fact enjoying it.  
Mill in his claim also said: “… I apprehend, the sole evidence that it 
is possible to produce anything is desirable is that people do actually 
desire it” (Mill, 1895:   ).  This means that something is desirable 
merely on the grounds that it is capable of stimulating desire.Again, 
Mill raises several legitimate questions in his analysis.  For instance, 
what is the source of the obligation of utilitarian morality? (Mill, 
1895). He adds that pleasure is to be gained and pains to be avoided 
by the agent who aims at general happiness.  Also, he lays special 
stress on a sanction which Bentham omitted to take note; the 
‘feeling of unity with his fellow-creatures, which makes a natural 
want of an individual of properly cultivated that his aims should be 
in harmony’ (Mill, 1971:    ). This feeling, according to Mill, in most 
individuals is much inferior in strength to their selfish feelings, but it 
presents itself to the minds of those who have it as an attribute 
which it would not be well for them to be without and this 
conviction is what Mill sees as the ultimate sanction of the greatest 
happiness morality (Sidgwick, 1967). 
Mill’s utilitarian thought is generally seen as a modification 
of Bentham’s ideas.  However, it has also been through much 
scrutiny and criticisms, especially the claim that pleasure alone is 
good and the further distinction that some pleasures are better 
pursued than others. Some moral philosophers like Urmson (1967) 
think that many of the critics of Mill actually do not understand him 
very well.  According to Urmson, the general position of Mill is 
that, an action is justified as being right by showing that it is in 
accord with some moral rule.  Also, a moral rule is shown to be 
correct by showing that the recognition of that rule promotes the 
ultimate end. 
We realize from Mill’s account that pleasure is always good 
for its own sake, thus, he refers to it as an ‘ultimate principle’.  To 
him, all men call something good because it is pleasant or conducive 
to pleasure and, thus, the only thing that men universally desire is 
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pleasure. Mill makes two observations that sparked controversy in 
his explanation of his version of utilitarianism.  First of all, he 
declared that pleasure and human happiness are one and the same 
thing. That is, to say that a man is happy is to say that he is 
experiencing pleasure and to say that he is unhappy is to say that he 
is experiencing pain (Mill, 1895).Secondly, Mill claims that 
pleasure is good no matter whose pleasure it is. That is your 
neighbour’s pleasure has precisely the same value as the pleasure of 
your own. Thus, if pleasure is good by its very nature, then, its 
goodness does not depend on where it is or by whom it is 
experienced.  This view influenced him in his assertion that if 
pleasure is alone good in itself, then, it is every man’s duty to 
maximise it and to minimise pain.  An analysis of moral conduct is 
not complete when the motive for which an action is done is not 
taken into consideration.  In fact, we sometimes bestow praise or 
blame on an individual based on the motive from which he acted.  
Thus, we are inclined to consider not what a person has done, but, 
what moved him to do what he did.  Kant, for instance, played down 
the idea of looking at the consequences of an action.  He was 
concerned with the motive behind the action.  To him, so far as an 
individual’s motive for a particular action is that of a dutiful motive, 
that action carries a moral worth.  An action which is not promoted 
by a sense of duty is, however, not qualified as moral.  
Furthermore, in dealing with the quality of pleasure, Mill 
had to respond to a criticism levelled against the Epicureans.  It 
states that to assert that we should try to increase the total amount of 
pleasure to the maximum level seems to suggest that we should 
convert the whole world into an amusement park, disregarding all 
those fruits of civilized life that men prize and replace them with 
cheap and simple feeling of pleasure (Taylor, 1979). In their 
response, the Epicureans said that pleasure differ in many ways and 
as a result rejected the Cyrenaic way of life.  Mill also in his 
response argues, as noted, that some pleasures are inherently better 
than others.  He, even, proposed a test by which we can discriminate 
between these ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ pleasures.  He proposes that 
when we consult the man who has experienced both ‘higher’ and 
‘lower’ pleasures, we will find out that he prefers ‘higher’ pleasures 
(Mill, 1895). 
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It, however, seems that Mill is giving primacy to the 
opposite view.  He seems to entertain the view that man performs 
his duty in cases when his actions foster happiness in all who are 
affected by such actions.  Thus, Mill gives primacy to consequences 
rather than the motive of duty.  What we think is that when we say 
that a man’s action is dutiful it must surely be a function of either 
his motive or the consequences of his actions and so the opposite 
views exercised by Kant and Mill can be reconciled.  It was, 
therefore, not very relevant for Mill to spend time explaining that his 
utilitarianism incorporated the very concept of duty.It must be noted 
that Mill was motivated by a number of factors to offer a different 
dimension to utilitarianism.  He was first of all moved by the 
various problems that Bentham’s version posed hence his 
modifications.  Secondly and more generally, he was also 
responding to the general ethical question as to whether universal 
ethical guidelines are possible.  Thus, for Mill, utilitarianism is the 
most practicable and all-encompassing theory that fits well in moral 
deliberations.  And so, he suggests in Utilitarianism that there is an 
ethical principle which could act as the foundation for universal 
ethical conduct. He thus stated: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of 
morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness 
principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they 
tend to produce the reverse of happiness.  By 
happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of 
pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of 
pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral 
standard set up by the theory, much more requires 
to be said; in particular, what thing it includes in 
the ideas of pain and pleasure and to what extent 
this is left an open question.  (Mill, 1979:    ) 
 Mill agrees with Bentham that actions are good as they 
maximise pleasure and bad as they maximise the reverse of pleasure 
(Mill, 1895). One can unhesitatingly say that Mill believes that all 
actions are directed towards a particular end.  By this end, there 
might be intermediate ends in actions that we take but the ultimate 
end in all actions is the pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of 
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pain.  For instance, when we go to school, our earned certificates 
will help us to get good job, get money and have a fulfilled and 
satisfying life.  Though we might encounter painful and unpleasant 
circumstances whilst going to school, the chain ultimately ends with 
pleasure and the avoidance of pain. On this note, we get the 
impression from Mill that the ultimate end of human beings is the 
maximisation of happiness.  This is because Mill claims that when 
we talk of an end of human actions, that end must be desirable.  The 
ultimate end of all actions is happiness and happiness is the only 
thing desirable as an end. 
In proposing that actions are good in proportion as they tend 
to promote happiness and prevent pain, Mill implies that, on the one 
hand, as far as actions are concerned, the more we produce pleasure 
and the more we minimize pain the better the action becomes.  On 
the other hand, Mill is concerned with the quality of the happiness 
being produced.  What we generally get from Mill, here, is that what 
is good or a good ethical life is one that is rich in happiness - both 
quantity and quality.  To test the quality of happiness, Mill believes 
that we can use human preferences. He further holds the view that, 
whenever we want to choose between both pleasures, the best 
decision rest with individuals who have had experiences with both 
higher and lower pleasures (they are better placed to choose) and 
they would choose higher pleasures over lower pleasures.  Thus, he 
said, “… it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally 
acquainted with and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying 
both do give a marked preference to the existence that employs their 
higher faculties” (Mill, 1979:   ).The general inference made from 
Mill’s thought is that the question of the summumbonum which 
constitutes the foundation of morality has been with us since the 
dawn of philosophy.  This has accounted for the main problems in 
speculative thoughts, occupied the most gifted intellects and further 
divided them into opposing schools waging intellectual war against 
each other. The thematic claim of utilitarianism is the greatest 
happiness principle which holds that actions are right in proportion 
as they tend to maximize happiness and when it is geared towards 
the maximization of pain, such an action becomes wrong (Mill, 
1971). 
Humanely speaking, it is not only by the performance of an 
action that we consider as morally potent but also the consequences 
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count as well.  Let us note that even though Mill agreed with 
Bentham on the main utilitarian principle or the greatest happiness 
principle, he greatly differed from Bentham in the areas of 
prioritising pleasure.  Here, Mill offered his qualitative 
modifications with the additional thought that pleasures being 
experienced by humans also differ in various ways.  This view of 
Mill is important in establishing the moral worth of promoting 
higher pleasures which are largely intellectual over lower ones 
which are largely bodily pleasures, even though the latter promises 
to be intense.  Also, Mill is of the view that the difficulty in 
achieving happiness in a positive way usually makes it justifiable for 
sentient beings to seek the minimisation of pain in all actions that 
we take. However, pain is acceptable when it has the tendency of 
leading to a greater good for all.  It must also be noted that Mill 
equally responded to the criticism that individual agents cannot 
devote their primary time and energies making unending 
calculations of actions and their effects in order to perform them.  In 
his response, Mill appealed to rule utilitarianism.  Thus, he was of 
the view that we need to properly act in accordance with moral 
rules. Rule utilitarianism urges us to act in accordance with certain 
rules whose end result is the achievement of pleasure.  Even though 
we act in accordance with moral rules, the value of each action we 
take is determined by reference to the principle of utility. 
It must be noted that Kant sees the motivation of acting 
morally as the respect for the moral law.  Mill shares a different 
view, to him, what motivates people to do the right thing or act 
morally can be attributed to moral sanctions – among other things.  
Here, Mill differed a bit from Bentham, he did not only appeal to 
moral sanctions and socially imposed sanctions like punishment and 
blame, but he reasoned further that there are internal sanctions like 
self-esteem, guilt and conscience which bid us to act morally.  As 
social animals, it is easy to find out that every action that we take 
affect others as well, and though we might not be blamed or 
punished by society for performing certain actions, our sense of 
guilt and conscience are enough to propel us to do the right thing in 
so far as we are rational.Mill is undoubtedly a rule utilitarian by this 
version of utilitarianism that is, he alludes to the thought that there 
are rules that are geared towards the maximisation of happiness.  
Thus, rule utilitarianism stipulates that it is better to follow a rule 
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like promise keeping which might do more good than harm in terms 
of utility rather than allowing lying that might promote greater good.  
 
Towards Categorical Pleasure: Eclectic Approach 
With the passage of time, our ethical consideration has become more 
complex by the day. We believe that the best ethical theory is one 
which combines the strong points of different ethical views. And so, 
we think it is possible for an aspect of utilitarianism in this case, 
Mill’s pleasure, to be fused into Kant’s deontology, specifically the 
categorical imperative, to create an attractive synthesis for practical 
moral assessment.Kant’s deontology recognises the categorical 
imperative as the fundamental principle that ought to underlie all 
actions. The imperative basically states that moral agents must act 
with the will that their actions can be raised to the level of a universal 
law. Our purpose here is to identify areas of possible harmony with 
pleasure.When we look at the categorical imperative and the various 
interpretations given by some moral philosophers, we realise that the 
views are diverse. For instance, Ebbinghaus (1954) believes that 
Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative is so clear that it should 
hardly be misinterpreted. In this sense, moral philosophers who find 
it difficult to understand the requirement of the categorical 
imperative mostly concern themselves with the content of the 
categorical command and the inferences to be drawn from it. We 
believe this should be the best direction of assessment we can give 
the categorical command when we decide to look at the verbal 
definition of the categorical imperative the principle becomes simple 
but this will not bring out the moral import that the principle of the 
categorical imperative proposes to carry. 
Kant’s moral imperative is not the one which man acts upon 
under the condition of experience but rather it is a way of expressing 
the conditions under which a principle can have a categorical 
demand. In other words, Kant’s principle does not emanate from our 
sensual experiences like pleasures or pain but it is a principle which 
directs us to how we ought to act. Ebbinghaus (1954) agrees that the 
categorical imperative is conceived as a fundamental principle which 
determines the laws that can be objectively valid for the decisions of 
our will. For instance, whenever we see ourselves as having a duty to 
perform certain action, we mean that we have a categorical command 
in mind or an objectively valid principle innate upon which we act. 
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Further, Kant (1964) claims that acting in accordance with the 
categorical imperative is a performance of one’s duty. Thus, the 
categorical imperative determines the concept of duty solely from its 
form. In other words, the imperative states what duty is and also the 
forms of duties we have. In this way, the categorical imperative is 
seen as failing to show how particular duties which it (categorical 
imperative) determines differ, at least materially, from one another. 
This becomes the formal character of the categorical imperative as a 
law of duty and it also provides the basis for a misinterpretation of 
the categorical imperative. Thus, the misinterpretation consists in the 
thought that defining duty in the formal sense necessarily confines 
moral philosophy rather than to state what the concept of duty is as 
regards its form and this makes it impossible to articulate particular 
duties that are materially different. 
The idea we wish to state is that every concept of duty must 
begin by stating what duty consists in, that is, stating what the 
concept of duty is with regard to its form. For instance, if we say of a 
particular duty as consisting of producing pleasure for the individual 
alone, we have determined the concept of duty simply as regards its 
form. Even though we seem to agree that the focus of interpreting the 
categorical imperative must not necessarily be confined to its form, 
we think it is also the case that in determining the concept of duty, 
there is prudence in looking at its form, that is what that duty 
generally characterises. In this sense, the form of duty consists of 
abstract conception whereby duty is defined in abstraction without 
regard to its actual application in behaviour. This gives a clear, 
consistent and unequivocal view of the duty in question. This, we 
believe, Kant did in his ethics. Let us note that the formal 
characteristics and definition of duty also accounts for conditions 
under which that particular duty must be performed as well as the 
criteria by which such an action counts as duty. However, we believe 
that an account of what duty is does not only end at the formal 
definition. The material differences between duties are equally 
important as well. 
Further analysis into Kant’s thought, indeed, reveals that he 
was concerned with both the formal and the material conceptions of 
duty. The categorical imperative is also a material conception of duty 
whereby moral agents apply their formal conception of duty. It 
defines an action which is our duty and how we ought to act in 
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accordance with the requirements of duty. In other words, moral 
agents will have to apply Kant’s formal conception of duty in 
determining the moral status of any given moral action such as 
enacting moral laws. In doing this, the key factor is whether or not 
the action passes the universalisability test. In this case, moral agents 
become legislators, not only for themselves but for others as well.  
The categorical imperative seems vulnerable in some 
instances. For instance, there are instances when the imperative is 
abused and still holds valid. This sometimes calls for exception when 
acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. Hegel (1972) in 
his criticism of Kant claimed that whenever Kant deduced or tried to 
deduce particular kinds of duties, he found himself just going round 
in a vicious circle. The reason being that, in order to show a 
contradiction between a maxim and the possibility of willing that the 
maxim becomes a universal law, one has to always presuppose a 
possibility of a violation which rests on no one but the individual. 
That is, whenever a moral agent acts in a certain way, the maxim 
upon which he acts are purely from the innate goodwill and the 
justification of such a maxim is ultimately his own duty. What 
happens, then, is that, it becomes possible to put forward any kind of 
arbitrary conduct as a demand of duty. Mill (1895) agrees with this 
view when he said of Kant that, when Kant infers some precepts 
from actual duties of morality, he fails to show that there would be 
any contradiction in its adoption by all rational beings, especially in 
the case of immoral rules of conduct (Mill, 1895:10).   
Furthermore, the categorical imperative has been scrutinised 
and challenged on the basis that moral requirements are not 
categorical but rather hypothetical. Let us note that Kant 
distinguished between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. The 
categorical imperative is a command that directs us on how we ought 
to act in order to be moral, the hypothetical is however a conditional 
imperative which is directed towards the achievement of certain 
ends. Kant holds that what is moral is a categorical command and 
they emanate from our motive of duty to perform an action with the 
will that the action passes the test of universal application. 
Hypothetical imperatives are, however, imperatives of feeling and 
desires which have a teleological tendency. Morality, in Kant’s view, 
is not concerned with the consequences of actions since, more often 
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than not, consequences are beyond the control of man (Kant, 1975). 
Simply put, Kant claims that moral requirements are categorical.  
Philosophers such as Ayer (1946) criticized Kant by saying 
that when we say moral laws hold as categorical commands, we 
mean so because some individuals have their moral motivation 
emanating from God’s displeasure or concern for being isolated and 
antagonized by society (Ayer, 1946).  This view coheres with 
Broad’s (1959) claim that some imperatives which we may call 
categorical, at least in the lives of some individuals, were once 
hypothetical and, then, gradually became categorical because of the 
strengths that individuals themselves gave it (Broad, 1959).  As a 
result, some philosophers see nothing wrong with commands being 
hypothetical, provided such a command can be applied universally.  
The question that arises thereof is what principle counts as moral.  
This question has attracted varied reactions from moral 
philosophers. Foot (1989) opines that moral requirements, contrary to 
Kant’s views, are, in fact, hypothetical. For her, moral requirements 
are not independent of desires, for desires play an important role on 
the reason of an individual to act morally. She further observes that, 
“it is not evident that a man’s desires could not give him reason to act 
honestly” (Foot, 1989:278). The difference between categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives are that categorical imperatives tell man 
what he ought to do, whatever his desires or interests whilst 
hypothetical tell man what he ought to do because he wants 
something as well as what he ought to do on grounds of self-interest 
(1989). This is a linguistic distinction of both commands, and her 
disagreement with Kant starts from here. She reasoned that if, 
indeed, moral requirements are categorical and as a result the 
linguistic distinction between categorical and hypothetical 
imperatives is potent, then, other rules such as rules of etiquette 
would be` categorical since it is also independent of our desires and 
feelings. 
In order to prove that rules like etiquette are not moral 
requirements, Kant must ascribe categorical imperatives special 
dignity and necessity which the mere linguistic distinction cannot 
capture. In other words, Foot observes, the claim that moral 
requirements are categorical needs additional proof to properly 
distinguish it from other rules, by which claim it must be able to, in 
fact, prove that moral requirements are independent of desires and 
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feelings. These views are also shared by Dreier (1997) in his 
observation that moral requirements are hypothetical. This is so 
because moral requirements are not independent of desires and so if 
the characterisation of categorical imperative is independent of 
desires, then, moral requirements are not categorical. He further 
opines that “A categorical imperative is one that each person has 
reason to follow, no matter what her desires” (Dreier, 1997, 96). And 
so “the only sort of reasons are instrumental reasons and this means 
that moral reasons are not categorical, they depend for their 
compelling force on contingent desires” (1997, 87).  
We, thus, realise that there are times when there do not seem 
to be any problem in saying that we behave morally because we feel 
in a certain way, since it sometimes becomes natural because of our 
psychological way of learning what is moral. As a result of some of 
these concerns, Foot (1989) argues that we normally act on what is 
moral, not because we seem to be obliged by some reasons that are 
categorical but because we are taught to act morally and we want to 
promote the good of others. For categorical reasons are devoid of 
desires and we sometimes act morally based on feeling. For instance, 
a man who publicly declares that he is performing his duties to his 
children simply because it is his duty and not for any love or 
affection that he has towards his children would certainly not be 
liked by, even, his children, even though he is doing what is morally 
required of him. However, when he talks of the fact that he is looking 
after his children because of the love and affection he has for them, 
even, when he is not aware that it is his duty to do so, would 
certainly get the reciprocal love from his children. More so, one acts 
honestly because one is taught to be honest and it seems to also bring 
good to others. Kitcher (2004) seems to cast doubt on the view that 
we could attract moral principles from considerations of logic and 
rationality alone, as Kant proposes. In other words, it seems to be the 
case that Kant perceives morality as a matter of laws which are 
obligatorily applicable to all, a view captured by the concept of the 
categorical imperative. By this, morality is a matter of laws that 
holds universal application. It in fact seems to hold, as Kitcher 
observes, that Kant might have inherited such an idea from the 
natural law tradition where all human beings were equally “God’s 
children.” (Kitcher, 2004:578). We note, here, that the universal 
applicability of moral laws is a necessity in moral deliberations. The 
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other side of the issue is that moral laws do not always hold universal 
acceptance and that even when they do, they do not have universal 
application. It therefore becomes prudent to allow for exception since 
there are occasions when a moral law may be practicable in one 
instance but may not in another instance. This does not deny the fact 
that acting in accordance with what is moral must necessarily be 
obligatory at all times. Kant’s view that we are mostly distracted and 
influenced by other factors from acting on what counts as moral 
attests to the reason why it becomes obligatory to act, at least, most 
times in accordance with the moral law.  
Our argument then seems to gain support from Dewey 
(1944) that when we consider Kant’s deontology, it would be 
possible for any tyrant to supply an explanation by telling those in his 
power that what duty requires of them is their unconditional 
obedience and acceptance of his maxims. The effect is that if the will 
of the tyrant himself is to satisfy the principle of the categorical 
imperative, then, his subject must follow him in every possible 
exercise of their will. Ebbinghaus (1954), however, thinks that it is a 
misinterpretation of Kant since, for him, it is not possible to subject 
themselves under such a tyrant except when their own will 
determines them to this subjection. We see some difficulty in such a 
situation as to how we can have a universally and objective moral 
principle as Kant sets out to achieve. This is because there might be 
instances when someone might persuade another to act by his 
maxims means that ultimately, everyone will act the way he/she 
deems fit or in accordance with his maxims. The effect will be that 
society will lack cohesive principles. Also, it seems difficult whether 
Kant’s idea of duty for duty sake, when we act with the motive of 
duty, including duty to obey those in authority, will allow one to act 
in accordance with one’s own maxims when he is obliged to act by 
the maxims of a tyrant.  
It is, however, important to note that man generally is a 
social animal. In all, our actions sometimes have effects on other 
people. Thus, Kant, in fact, did not disagree with this view and this is 
evident in his idea of a maxim passing the universalisability test. In 
being socially connected it also behoves on us to ensure that our 
actions carry positive effects on others. As a result, whether moral 
agents will follow their maxims or the maxim of others, it is 
generally accepted that what is moral also carries with it a tag that it 
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should also promote the happiness of others as well. And so 
Ebbinghaus even observed;  
I do will my own happiness … I can, 
secondly, will the happiness of others. 
But in the third place, in willing my 
own happiness, I also will on the 
principle that others should will my 
happiness. Now if on my side I do not 
will the happiness of others, I cannot 
will that my maxim should be acted on 
by others and consequently I cannot 
will that it should be a law. Hence, if 
the categorical imperative is valid, there 
follows from it as a definite command 
of duty that I must include within my 
end of happiness, the happiness of 
others (Ebbinghaus, 1954:108). 
 What we have done is to analyse the categorical imperative 
in the light of some of the concerns raised by some philosophers 
about the acceptability of the theory. The import is to assess the 
strength of the imperative in order to create the harmony we want to 
achieve. With the criticisms and analysis raised the categorical 
imperative basically puts moral responsibility in the hands of the 
individual. Moral agents act with the full responsibility and will that 
their action can benefit others. When the imperative advocates that 
we act on maxims that can be universalised it simply means that we 
do not legislate for ourselves but for everyone who would find 
him/herself in the particular situation one legislated. The difficulty is 
that not all moral agents can consistently act on maxims that are 
universalisable and always do so out of duty. Kant’s view is that the 
categorical principle is known a priori and as such it takes purely 
rational moral agents to consistently act in accordance with the 
imperative. Thus, for moral agents to act in accordance with the 
categorical imperative without any problems, they must first of all, 
reach a certain rational height and be able to always act on their 
innate good will without any compulsion. However, moral agents 
who have not been able to work on their innate good will and as such 
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reached the rational stage that Kant envisages will always find it 
difficult acting in accordance with the stipulations of the categorical 
imperative and so need to be commanded to. For such moral agents, 
acting on the categorical imperative is an absolute duty. By this, such 
individuals act on duty for the sake of duty. Kant’s categorical 
imperative is still potent in directing us towards what is good and we 
think there are points where it merges with Mill’s qualitative 
pleasure. 
The thought of promoting the happiness of others when 
acting has also been an influence in the thought of utilitarians. In 
fact, happiness or pleasure as observed by utilitarians is the highest 
good and determines the way and manner that individual acts. A 
good act is one that promotes the happiness of the greatest number of 
people. Utilitarians mostly use pleasure and happiness 
interchangeably and we will not try any distinction even though there 
seem to be, at least, a difference in semantics. In his Principles of the 
Legislation of Morals, Bentham observed that pleasures are equal but 
only differ in quantity. This means that pleasures are calculable and 
moral agents ought to calculate the amount of pleasure an action will 
produce before acting. Bentham’s view was heavily criticised for 
advocating that we act to maximise any pleasure at all without any 
distinction. This made it necessary for Mill to offer his distinction 
between qualitative or higher pleasure and quantitative or lower 
pleasure. 
Mill observes that the ultimate end of utilitarianism is an 
existence which as far as possible exempts pain and is rich in 
enjoyment or happiness both in quantity and quality. Qualitative 
pleasure presupposes that there is always the need to look at the 
value of an action rather than the pleasantness of it. This is measured 
by the intellectual and rational development that the action will 
produce.When Mill proposes that pleasure can be conceived 
qualitatively, he means to say that mental pleasures are intrinsically 
more desirable and valuable than bodily pleasures (Mill, 1895). In 
other words, the superiority of qualitative pleasure far outweighs the 
quantitative measure of other compared pleasures. Mill termed 
qualitative pleasure as higher pleasure. Philosophers like Edwards 
(1979) suggest that Mill was influenced by the doctrine of Hutcheson 
who associated pleasure with knowledge and virtue and saw them as 
incomparably excellent and beatific than the most intense and lasting 
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enjoyments of the lower kinds (Hutcheson, 1969). We also 
conjecture that the thoughts of Plato in his Pheado might have also 
influenced Mill. This seems to be the case with the concept of 
eudaemonia in Greek classical philosophy (Aristotle,    ).  
Qualitative or higher pleasure involves pleasures that 
encompass intellectual, self-improvement and the rule of reason in 
enjoying happiness According to Mill, it should always be the case 
that if some pleasures are of high quality then they ought to be 
chosen over lower pleasures regardless of their respective quantities. 
Mill claims that we should choose higher pleasure no matter the 
situation we find ourselves in but was criticised as to what makes one 
pleasure valuable than the other and how we make such a choice. In 
other words, moral agents are being told to look at the quality of 
pleasure over quantity. In fact, in the analysis of Mill, rational agents 
ought to act in accordance with qualitative pleasure. But the question 
is what makes one pleasure more valuable or qualitative? To this, 
Mill observes that; 
 
The test of quality… is the preference felt by those 
who, in their opportunities of experience, to which 
must be added their habits of self-consciousness and 
self-observation are best furnished with the means 
of comparison (Mill, 1895:16). 
 
 This means that it is not the case that all moral agents will 
choose higher pleasures over lower pleasures. Those who were able 
to see the difference are those who have had the opportunity to 
experience both pleasures and have attained a level of rational 
cognition which will allow them to make such a choice. It is worthy 
of note that Mill does not necessarily say that higher or qualitative 
pleasures are more pleasant than lower or quantitative pleasures or 
that mental pleasures are necessarily more pleasant than physical 
pleasures, but that it is the question of ‘what makes one pleasure 
more valuable than another, merely as pleasure?’ (Mill, 
1895:14).Mill conceives of pleasure as not just any kind of 
satisfaction but rather the satisfaction that comes from exercising and 
developing the higher human faculties. This kind of happiness is 
found in the exercise of intelligence, imagination, skill and practice 
of moral virtue (Gibbs, 1986). The role that qualitative pleasure plays 
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is to assign a central place to the development of our human powers, 
especially, self-improvement. 
Again, Mill emphasises in his distinction that what 
distinguishes human beings from other animals is our mental power. 
With this power, we are able to discriminate between moral 
judgements, reasoning, imagination, aesthetic evaluation, etc. Also, 
moral agents are able to distinguish between higher and lower 
pleasures because of the mental power we possess. We note here that 
it is not everybody who is in the position to choose higher pleasures 
over lower pleasures. It is the one who is able to actively work on his 
mental capacity of discriminating between moral judgments. Thus a 
purely rational being is the one who will consistently choose higher 
pleasures over lower pleasures. According to Mill, one pleasure is 
generally more valuable than the other if competent judges prefer one 
over the other. In other words, the value of pleasure is determined not 
by its duration and intensity but by the preferences of competent 
judges. Mill conceives of a competent judge as one who has 
experienced both higher and lower pleasures and is consciously 
aware of the long and short term consequences and effects of both 
pleasures. The idea of competent judges has generated a lot of 
controversy among philosophers. But Mill states categorically that 
the competent judge must be acquainted with the different sorts of 
pleasure, must be equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures or 
is capable of enjoying the different kinds of pleasures and finally is 
able to make effective choices (Mill, 1895). 
We realise that Mill’s idea of competent judges are those 
who have attained a higher level of rational cognition and cannot be 
easily corrupted by sensory pleasures. It is not everyone who is able 
to become a competent judge and is as such able to consistently 
choose qualitative pleasure over quantitative pleasure, regardless of 
the duration of pleasure involved. Mill’s thought rules out the 
criticism that the idea of competent judges are based on intellectual 
elitism because all moral agents have the capacity of attaining a 
rational level required to make a distinction between lower and 
higher pleasures. 
Generally, we find the two concepts as having a merging 
point and thus become a point of harmony. The categorical 
imperative posits that we act with the will that our maxims can be 
universalised. Thus moral agents must consistently act with the 
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thought that those actions will hold universal applicability. The 
imperative gives absolute moral responsibility to the moral agent. It 
is realised that one has to reach a certain rational peak in order to be 
able to act consistently according to the principle of the categorical 
imperative. The categorical imperative also demands that moral 
agents think through their actions thoroughly before acting. The 
difficulty lies in how one is able to act in accordance with a 
consistently universalised maxim. The point is that it takes moral 
agents who have attained a level of rational cognition to do so. Kant 
thought of the good will as the basic good which is behind all 
actions, it is intrinsic but it is only the rational man who is able to act 
on the good will with the sense of duty. It means that the good will, 
which is the will behind our thoughts and actions that pass the 
universalibility test, is innate in every man, and acting according to 
the good will is acting in accordance with the requirements of the 
fundamental principle of morality – the categorical imperative. It, 
however, takes a certain intellectual and rational height to realise and 
be able to consistently act in accordance with the categorical 
imperative. 
One major common denominator underlying the categorical 
imperative and qualitative pleasure is the unaided use of reason and 
intellectual capacity. Qualitative pleasure, in the way Mill conceives 
it, also demands moral responsibility from moral agents. The import 
is that one is morally underdeveloped when he/she chooses lower 
pleasure over higher pleasure. It is, for instance, if it becomes 
difficult to shun having fun at a beach to reading a literature book. 
The import is that moral agents must reach a high stage of rational 
decision making and control oneself before he/she can consistently 
choose qualitative pleasure over quantitative pleasure. In other 
words, it takes a moral agent who is self-conscious and has reached a 
high level of rational appreciation. This is the reason why Mill 
appeals to the competent judge. Conscious of the controversy this 
idea of competent judge has created, we think that the judge is the 
moral agent who has reached an appreciable level of self-control, 
rational cognition and intellectual understanding. 
And so, both concepts demand that in order to achieve the 
moral height we ought to, there is the need to reach a rational level 
that allows us to appreciate and take moral decisions without any 
external promptings. The role of reason in moral action has been 
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appreciated by both Kant and Mill. Kant sought to put morality on 
the foundation of pure reason where moral agents do not act on the 
basis of mere empirical factors. Kant sees morality as purely a priori 
and observes that it is the only means by which we can rid ethics of 
its problems. Mill did not disagree with Kant that reason must be 
allowed to play a major role in moral decision making. This is 
because it is not possible for moral agents who are not purely rational 
to choose qualitative pleasure over quantitative pleasure. Thus, even 
though, it might not be clear as Kant puts it, Mill’s qualitative 
pleasure demands that we reach a certain rational and intellectual 
level before we can act. 
It is the case that a human being with low level of mental 
faculty can easily gain satisfaction of his desires and be made fully 
content because he has low capacities of enjoyment. But he is not 
capable of the same level of happiness as a person of superior 
intelligence and character. Thus the higher being is more liable to 
pain, must suffer more discontent and will never be perfectly happy; 
yet his condition is happier and better (Gibbs, 1986). Acting in 
accordance with the categorical imperative is a duty and the same 
applies to Mill’s higher pleasure. Moral agents must as a matter of 
duty choose qualitative pleasure if their action will have a moral 
worth. This integrates the ideal utilitarianism of Moore whereby he 
observes that there are some concepts that do not necessarily denote 
pleasure but are qualitative, for instance, friendship and aesthetic 
value. The categorical imperative can therefore be merged with 
qualitative pleasure to mean that it is categorical that we choose a 
qualitatively pleasurable action. In this way it becomes easier to 
universalise our maxims. Thus the good will also allow moral agents 
to act in accordance with the value of qualitative pleasures.  
Conclusion 
What we have done is create an opening of harmony for two pivotal 
concepts found in two theories that lie at the extreme ends of the 
moral continuum. The concept in utilitarianism that we sought to 
merge with Kant’s deontology is, Mill’s qualitative pleasure, With 
Kant’s deontology, we look at the categorical imperative. We see 
these concepts as creating an opening for integration.Generally 
therefore, Kant’s categorical imperative is summarised in one famous 
example. Consider the person who needs to borrow money and is 
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considering making a false promise to pay it back. The maxim that 
could be invoked is ‘when in need of money, borrow it, promising to 
repay it, even though you do not intend to.’ But when we generally 
apply the universality test to this maxim, it becomes clear that if 
everyone were to act in this way, the institution of promising itself 
would be undermined. The borrower would always make a promise, 
willing that there be no such thing as promises (Kant, 1959). 
There are some principles in both Kant’s deontology and 
utilitarianism that allow for a harmony between the two theories. 
Both theories observe the need for a moral action to be altruistic. The 
utilitarian argues that the good act is that which satisfies the greatest 
number of people. By this the welfare of the majority is taken into 
consideration. This view allows for the possibility that an action 
cannot always satisfy everybody but, at least, if the greatest number 
of people benefit from such an action, then, it is good. This view has 
been criticised for neglecting the minority. We, however, think that 
sometimes the greatest number does not necessarily mean a 
calculated number, but rather maximum applicability. Kant also 
shares an altruistic view since he believes that a moral law must be 
able to hold universal acceptance. As a result, any action that one 
takes must carry the will that the action becomes a universal law for 
anybody at anytime. In other words, the rational man is the one who 
legislates for all and so if an action A favours one but will not favour 
another when he is in the particular situation in which I am, then, I 
am not obliged to act in accordance with such an action.  
The categorical imperative and qualitative pleasure both 
elicit from the moral agent a recognition of high moral standard and 
understanding. The basic underlying force is the motivation of duty 
as well as the intellectual height. Thus the hedonic expert proposed 
by Mill, is the one who has experiential and the leisure of 
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The moral man in Kant’s deontology is that person who has 
been able to universalise his actions without any adverse effect on 
society in practice. Such a person legislates from a subject maxim to 
an objective principle for which the categorical imperative becomes 
the framework. Thus the concept seems to run in different streams 
but converge to the same estuary.  
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